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POWER, LAW, AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND
THE WILL TO LAW. By Edgar Bodenheimer.1  New York: Crane,
Russak & Company, Inc., 1973. Pp. viii, 202. $9.75.
Jurisprudence is entering a golden age. After fitful progress
through the centuries, legal philosophy has been raised, with studies
of the last couple of decades, to heights of importance for our under-
standing both of law itself and of societal and ethical obligation. "Law"
is beginning to look much more complex than it ever appeared to Ben-
tham and Austin, and the complexity provides a rich tapestry for our
understanding of social control. In recent years, Hart2 and Dworkin'
have demonstrated how classical positivism must be refined-if not
changed-to understand constitutional and statutory interpretation,
while Fuller4 has launched a frontal attack on positivism itself. Other
writers such as Edgar Bodenheimer have been less concerned with the
meaning of law than with how law works. In his latest book, Power,
Law, and Society, Professor Bodenheimer criticizes the view that law
is an instrument of the strong to dominate the weak (as Thrasymachus
put it in a Platonic dialogue) 5 or, in modern terms, an instrument of
I. Professor of Law, University of California-Davis.
2. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H.L.A. HART, DEFINmTIONS
AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1953); H.L.A. HART, LAw, LiBERTY, AND MORALrIy
(1963): Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593
(1958); Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CI. L. REV.
1 (1967); Hart, Varieties of Responsibility, 83 L.Q. REV. 346 (1967). See also Tay-
lor, H.L.A. Hart's Concept of Lan, in the Perspective of American Legal Realism, 35
MODERN L. REV. 606 (1972).
3. See Dworkin, Does Law Have a Function? A Comment on the Two-Level
Theory of Decision, 74 YALE L.J. 640 (1965); Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U.
CHi. L. REV. 14 (1967); Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality and Law--Observations
Prompted by Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 668 (1965); Dworkin,
Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE LJ. 855 (1972).
4. See L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); L. FULLER, THE Mo-
RALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century,
6 J. LEGAL ED. 457 (1954); Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JtuRIs.
I (1969): Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958). See also Breckenridge, Legal Positivism and the Natural Law:
The Controversy Between Professor Hart and Professor Fuller, 18 VAND. L. REV. 945
(1965).
5. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 18 (F. Cornford transl. 1941):
[Iln every case the laws are made by the ruling party in its own interest; a
democracy makes democratic laws, a despot autocratic ones, and so on. By
making these laws they define as "right" for their subjects whatever is for
their own interest, and they call anyone who breaks them a wrongdoer" and
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the "establishment." The ethical roots of his concern are manifested
by his -treatment of two basic problems: stability/change in the law,
and equality.
In a way, these are age-old problems, but Professor Bodenheimer
illustrates the new approach to jurisprudence by the multidisciplinary
tools he brings to his analysis. He delves into quantum mechanics
and relativity theory, Adlerian and child psychology, and physical and
cultural anthropology. In a fascinating first chapter, the author re-
lates Nietzsche's conception of the chaotic flux and essential meaning-
lessness of human striving to the view that many young people today
have, who are "turned off" about law. Nietzsche -presciently foresaw
the modem cosmological -theory of the cyclical universe, starting with
a "big bang" of condensed matter, exploding stars creating their own
"space," and expansion over billions of years until' the point where
gravitational forces overcome the momentum of the initial explosion
and contraction occurs. 6  The forces of contraction eventually pull
all matter together in a huge, indefinitely dense mass which again ex-
plodes, repeating the cosmological cycle. There is no "progress" in
this view, no room for a teleological or religious view of the purpose
of the universe. Nietzsche concluded that we might as well grab all
we can at anyone else's expense in -this valueless and absurd world.
"Law," to Nietzsche, was an instrument of the power-grabbers, which
they break whenever it suits their self-interest (something like the
staunch law-and-order henchmen of President Nixon).
Professor Bodenheimer goes on to argue that the Nietzschean view
is wrong cosmologically, that a certain order reigns in the universe,
and that the universe is governed by physical laws. Citing Max
Planck,7 among others, the author concludes that Nietzsche's eternal
chaos "does not, therefore, hold up -as a tenable scientific proposi-
tion."8  Yet I am not convinced that the author has proved his case,
particularly in his discussion of quantum mechanics. It is 'hard to find
any "law" in a causal sense for subatomic particles, but Professor Bo-
punish him accordingly.... [Iln all states alike "right" has the same
meaning, namely what is for the interest of the party established in power,
and that is the strongest.
6. See generally W. KAUFMAN, NIEmTCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTI-
cmRST 206-15 (1950).
7. M. PLANCK, WHERE IS SCIENCE GOING? 68-98 (1932), cited in E. BODEN-
HEIMER, POWER, LAW AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND THE WILL
TO LAw 22 n.18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BODENHEIMERI.
8. BODENHEIMER 22.
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denheimer brushes this aside by saying that when these particles are
aggregated, matter behaves according to laws with which we are fa-
miliar, such as gravitation. But macro-phenomena seem to behave ac-
cording to Newtonian-Einsteinean laws only because we see a fraction
of reality, because our sensory inputs and our measuring instruments
are so crude and gross that we cannot measure the uncertainties of
the fundamental building blocks of matter. Under Heisenberg's un-
certainty principle,9 we can never determine -the position and momen-
tum of any elementary particle. 10 Moreover, we necessarily interfere
with whatever position a particle may have by our very act of measur-
ing it; for example, the electromagnetic wave of an electron micro-
scope cannot "see" a subatomic particle in theory without moving it.
More basic, perhaps, is our growing recognition that our very language
is totally inadequate to describe what these fundamental particles may
be." Indeed, they may not be "particles" at all, or even "waves;" there
is nothing like them in any experience we can have, so we have no
words to describe them. We can only "view" quantum mechanics
through the crude classical language that we have developed for macro-
phenomena. To say that there is any "law" governing quantum me-
chanics in the causal sense of that term is to use language that is fun-
damentally inappropriate to the description of the subject.' 2 Perhaps
the comfort we take in the laws of physics is simply a product of our
extremely limited knowledge of the universe; self-centered as we are,
we assume that the entire universe is governed by Newtonian princi-
ples.
I have considered the author's 'arguments seriously and at some
length because I accept his premise that these sorts of questions bring
home to us the true context within which we should approach legal
philosophy. I would offer as an alternative to the author's refutation
of Nietzsche the hypothesis that we simply do not know whether the
universe is governed by the laws of physics as we know them. Our
9. See W. HEISENBERG, NATURAL LAW AND THE STRUCTURE OF MATrER (1970);
W. HEISENBERG, THE PHYSICIST'S CONCEPTION OF NATuE (A. Pomerans transl. 1958).
10. See I R. FEYNMAN, R. LEIGHTON & M. SANDS, THE FEYNMAN LEcTuREs ON
PHysics 37-9 to -12 (1963).
11. See N. BOHR, ATOMIC THEORY AND THE DESCRIPTION OF NATURE (1934);
QUANTUM THEORY AND BEYOND (T. Bastin ed. 1971).
12. See Schumacher, Time and Physical Language, in THE NATURE OF TIME 196
(T. Gold ed. 1967).
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problem then is: Can we construct a jurisprudence on such an uncer-
tainty? My proposal for something stable 'as a foundation for jurispru-
dence is moral philosophy. Ethics may be some sort of a human con-
stant even in a chaotic world. I might even draw such an inference
from Professor Bodenheimer's rather exact and absolutist view of
"justice" that pervades his book. He seems to assume almost blindly
that his readers share with him certain basic notions of justice and,
while he does not analyze this assumption, I think he is correct in hold-
ing it. But the inquiry as to universals in moral philosophy opens a
vast area which I -think is already starting to be explored and will pick
up momentum in the next decade.' 3
Even though Professor Bodenheimer uses justice and morality as
a basis for criticism rather than turning his attention to these concepts
directly, his writing is obviously animated by a strong feeling that law
works in the direction of morality.'4  In discussing stability/change in
the law, he argues well that if the law did not change over time to
reflect new social concerns with new opinions regarding justice, it
would soon become irrelevant.' 5 Our Constitution, for example, has
had to be interpreted as a "living Constitution" for its old language
to expand to meet new feelings against discrimination, economic in-
equalities, and governmental interference with private life. But in
what sense does the "law" survive if it changes? Here I think the
author's many examples are more impressive than his courageous at-
tempt -to cope with the linguistic problem involved. Not wanting to
be overly concerned with defining law, at one point he simply refers
to "law" as "an aggregate of standards designed to control private and
official conduct."' 6  But then, when law changes do the standards
change? When a court overrules a precedent, what has happened to
the earlier standard? Should law be called a set of changing stand-
ards? If so, a basic self-contradiction seems to need further analysis.
Suppose an old standard based in law is that a married woman cannot
hold real property in her own name; then a court overrules that stand-
ard, or a legislature replaces it with a new law to the opposite effect.
Can we really say that "law" has survived? Perhaps the author only
13. Already, the hallmark of this return to moral philosophy is J. RAwLs, A Tn-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971), and the critical reaction it has engendered.
14. See L. FuLLER, THE LAw iN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); L. FULLER, TnE Mo-
ALrrAy OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
15. BODENEIMER 120-27.
16. Id. at 122.
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means that law as an institution has survived, rather than a particular
law. But then we are confronted with the term "legal institution"-
what is it? A set of changing standards? Maybe there is something
akin to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle operating in our attempt to
describe what we mean by law that changes over time, and I think
a great deal more careful analysis still is needed regarding this prob-
lem.
I am somewhat uneasy over a definitional matter in the author's
treatment of the second large area of his concern, that of equality.
In his extended discussion of this basic problem of justice, he considers
in turn slavery under Roman law, women's rights, and the rights of
employees. Defending "law" against those who today view law with
cynicism, Professor Bodenheimer attempts ,to show that when gross in-
equalities were taking place, the "law" was not to blame for them.
For example, as to slavery:
Roman law, in the earlier phases of its development, stopped at the
threshold of the Roman household or slave estate, barring its entry
into the field of master-slave relations by an "off limits" sign. With-
out authorizing or legalizing any use or abuse of power by the slave
owner, the law simply refrained from extending its sway over this area
of social life."7
The early absolute rights of a slave owner over his slave, of a husband
over his wife, and of an employer (contractually) over his employees
are "held to be outside the realm of the law" because they are "wholly
arbitrary and oppressive systems of domination."' 8
But let us consider what "law" means in the author's image of law
which stops at the threshold of a Roman slave estate. What makes
the law stop there? Is it the law itself that posts and enforces the
"off limits" sign? If the barrier is of -the law's own choosing, then
surely the law cannot escape blame. Indeed, we know from the au-
thor's careful analysis that over the years the law chipped away at in-
equalities regarding slaves, women, and employees; therefore, the law
17. Id. at 136.
18. Id. at 138. The author writes with the modesty of older stylistic schools in
his refu-al to use the first person. A troubling result is occasional difficulty in deter-
mining whether an argument in the book is the author's or is shared by many. In
the sentence quoted, to say that these rights are "held" to be outside the realm of law
is to suggest that some impartial outside body has so "held." But further struggle with
the sentence indicates that it is only Professor Bodenheimer who is so "holding."
BOOK REVIEWS
Washington University Open Scholarship
380 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
must have been overcoming its own barriers, and only to the extent
that it did so is it worthy of approbation.
Yet Professor Bodenheimer seems to view "law" as stopping at the
threshold of the slave estate due to lack of power. The law stopped
at the -threshold because the state did not at this time have the power
to intervene in strong households. Later, when the state became more
powerful vis-A-vis enclaves of entrenched interests (such as slave es-
tates or factories), then the law came to be a factor promoting equal-
ity.
The trouble with this power-oriented view of law is that it contra-
dicts the author's own concept of law as a "set of standards."1" If
"law" -is the same thing as state power, so that the law that lacked
power stopped at the threshold, -then anything -the state does is coex-
tensive with "law." A state can only act legally; officials can only act
legally; Hitler's acts were all legal. Law cannot be a set of standards
designed to control official conduct, yet this is precisely what the au-
thor defined law to be in a different part of his book. It would cer-
tainly be fair for a critic of law to say that if law is a set of standards
(as defined by Professor Bodenheimer), -then the law itself counte-
nanced a standard of arbitrary power for the slave owner in refusing
to limit his discretion. One of the legal standards of -those times,
therefore, was that slave owners could do anything they wanted to their
slaves without penalty. Only with the greatest artificiality could we
argue that the law was not responsible for the slaveowner's rights over
his slaves.
But despite my criticism of the author on this issue, I am in strong
sympathy with what he is 'trying to do. He wants to save the idea
of law for something that is somehow interconnected with morality,
so that when there are no standards or unjust standards, we should
conclude that there is something lacking in the appropriateness of de-
scribing the situation -as "legal." Law, in short, is somehow inherently
opposed to gross inequality such as slavery. Law and -injustice do not
mix well and when they do mix, the result is a gradual eroding of
injustice over 'time. This seems to be the author's true message, -and
it comes out in his discussion of the gradual amelioration of the injus-
tices of slavery, -the position of women, and the position of laborers.
Perhaps Professor Bodenheimer resists articulating his position as
19. See id. at 28-33.
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calling for the interconnection between law and morality because he
does not want to be pushed into Fuller's camp. Like Dworkin, Pro-
fessor Bodenheimer seems to be an uneasy positivist. He leans toward
the idea of law-morality but refuses to embrace it head-on. Yet his
students and his readers may take the plunge. There is, these days,
a great revival of interest in moral philosophy, and the best works
build upon the advances to linguistic precision that logical, positivism
has fostered. Ironically, that very precision now seems to be under-
mining positivism itself, much as Wittgenstein foresaw in his Philosoph-
ical Investigations (1953).20 In this context, Power, Law, and Society
may be seen as an important bridge between the older style of positiv-
ism and the new concern for morality. The humanistic, wide-ranging
examples brought forth by the author attest to the morality that Fuller
argues cannot be separated from law.
ANTHONY D'AMATO*
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW. By Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr.' New York: Charterhouse Books, Inc., 1974. Pp. xvi,
315. $8.95.
If there is a lack of scholarly treatises on military law, there is none
of popular polemics on the subject.
J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE xii (1974)
[C]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with
the nice subtleties of constitutional law.. . . [A] military trial is
marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice.
O'CALLAHAN V. PARKER, 395 U.S. 258,
265-66 (1969) (DOUGLAS, J.)
If, as widely believed, experience is the best teacher, certainly Justice
William Douglas offers unimpeachable credentials in the pure art and
high science of the detection of legal systems which are "singularly
inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law." His
1. Professor of Law, Yale University.
20. See H. PrnITN, WITGrENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 50-70 (1972).
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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